Development and verification of a software system for the probabilistic safety analysis of nuclear plants as part of the proryv project  by Abramov, L.V. et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
Nuclear Energy and Technology 2 (2016) 77–80 
www.elsevier.com/locate/nucet 
Development and verification of a software system for the probabilistic 
safety analysis of nuclear plants as part of the proryv project 
L.V. Abramov, A.M. Bakhmetyev, I.A. Bylov ∗, A.A. Vasyuchenkov 
JSC “Afrikantov OKB Mechanical Engineering” (JSC “Afrikantov OKBM”) 15 Burnakovskiy proyezd, 603704 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia 
Available online 24 May 2016 
Abstract 
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) normally requires the development of a sophisticated computer model of the nuclear plant with a 
comprehensive reliability and safety study based on respective software. In 2013–2015, CRISS 5.3, a PSA software system, was developed 
and verified by Afrikantov OKBM as part of the effort, entitled New Generation Codes, under the Proryv (Breakthrough) project. 
The paper presents a review of the software tools used in the industry for the PSA of nuclear units and analyzes the capabilities of these 
tools. 
It also describes in brief the CRISS 5.3 software system intended to model and analyze safety systems and the nuclear plant as the whole 
as part of probabilistic safety analyses at all nuclear plant lifecycle stages. 
The paper presents results of the CRISS 5.3 code verification through the comparison of the analysis results obtained using the CRISS 
5.3 system against analytical formulas and results of a qualitative and quantitative analysis based on certified nuclear plant PSA software 
tools. 
Copyright © 2016, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by 
Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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Bntroduction 
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) requires the develop-
ent of a sophisticated computer model of the nuclear plant
ith a comprehensive safety and reliability study based on
espective software. 
An effort, “New Generation Codes”, is being under way as
art of the federal target program “Nuclear Power Technolo-
ies of a New Generation for a Period of 2010–2015 and up to
he Year 2020 ′′ and the Proryv (Breakthrough) project. As part
f this effort, a PSA software system, called CRISS 5.3, was
eveloped and verified by Afrikantov OKBM in 2013–2015. ∗ Corresponding author. 
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.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creatiNuclear plants developed under the Proryv project feature
he following: 
– sophisticated probabilistic logical models of the nuclear
plant; 
– consideration of a great amount of accident sequences, in-
cluding those of a low probability; 
– a reliability analysis of systems with a high redundancy
level; 
– a reduction, by several orders of magnitude during an anal-
ysis, of the cutoff level for the minimal cutset probabilities.
These features have defined the major requirements to the
eveloped PSA software system. 
We shall consider the PSA software systems used in Rus-
ian nuclear power and describe in brief the CRISS 5.3 struc-
ure, key functions and verification results. 
 review of nuclear psa software systems 
The two major software systems used presently in Rus-
ia for the PSA of nuclear units are RiskSpectrum, Sweden,
1] and CRISS, Russia, [2] . cow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier 
vecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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Table 1 
Development of the Russian CRISS PSA software system. 
Time interval System Features Practical use 
Late 1980 s – early 1990s TREES CRISS ЕС -1066 AST-500, BN-600, BN-800, and VPBER-600 
reactors, small reactors 
Late 1990s CRISS 2.0 IBM PC, MS DOS PSA of Voronezh AST and Siberian Chemical 
Combine AST reactors 
2001–2002 CRISS 3.0 CRISS 3.1 IBM PC,MS DOS → MS Windows PSA of GT-MHR project, PSA of KLT-40S 
floating nuclear power unit 
2004–2009 CRISS 4.0 IBM PC,MS Windows 98 PSA of BN-600, small and medium reactors 
Nuclear personnel training 
Since 2009 CRISS 5.1 IBM PC, MS Windows XP, 7 PSAs of BN-600, BN-800, BN-1200, KLT-40S 
floating nuclear power unit, RITM-200 nuclear 
icebreaker’s propulsion plant PSA of MCC 
spent fuel storage 
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 RiskSpectrum is one of the most common nuclear plant
PSA software tools. Specifically, RiskSpectrum is designed to
address the entire spectrum of tasks involved in the develop-
ment and analysis of the nuclear plant’s probabilistic logical
model as part of level 1 and 2 PSAs [3] . Currently RiskSpec-
trum software is used in Russia to perform PSAs level 1 and
2 for nuclear units with VVER and RBMK reactors. 
The CRISS software system has been developed and im-
proved by Afrikantov OKBM during past 25 years. Different
generations of the CRISS software system have been broadly
used since the late 1980 s and the early 1990 s to support the
design and to perform the PSAs of nuclear plants of different
types ( Table 1 ). 
Currently in operation is CRISS 5.1, a fifth-generation soft-
ware system [4] . The system was certified by Rostekhnadzor
in 2011 for the probabilistic safety analysis of nuclear instal-
lations. 
The upgraded nuclear plant PSA software system shall pro-
vide for: 
– unlimited dimensionality of probabilistic logical models; 
– high-speed analysis of highly dimensional sophisticated
models; 
– avoidance of errors in integrating individual models of sys-
tems and accident sequences into an integrated nuclear
plant model; 
– use of versatile models to take into account common-cause
failures as applied to highly redundant systems. 
The upgrading of the CRISS software system also included
the implementation of an algorithm for determining the op-
timal composition of the system with regard for economic
criteria with the given reliability level. 
Criss 5.3 software system 
The CRISS 5.3 software system is designed to model and
analyze safety systems and the nuclear plant as the whole as
part of PSAs at all nuclear plant lifecycle stages. 
The CRISS software system was developed on the base
of "client-server" architecture using the common administeredatabase where user rights to make changes are differentiated.
racle Database 11 g Express Edition is used as the DBMS. 
The system’s server part contains the database including
eliability data, fault trees, event trees and analysis options
atabases. The server part supports the integrity of data in
torage and the user authentication based on the available in-
ormation. The client part supports the user interfaces with
he software system’s database, the developing of probabilis-
ic models using fault tree and event tree editors, qualitative
nd quantitative analyses of probabilistic models, and the ex-
mination and documentation of analysis results. 
The computational module of the upgraded CRISS 5.3
oftware system uses parallel computing algorithms and en-
ures a shorter time for the probabilistic logical model anal-
sis as compared to the certified version of the CRISS 5.1
oftware system. 
A generalized flowchart of the software system is shown
n Fig. 1. 
The CRISS software system allows to: 
– accumulate in database information about safety systems,
accidents initiating events, human errors taken into consid-
eration and components reliability data including common
cause failures (CCF) models parameters, initiating events
frequencies, operability tests scheduling for safety systems
components; 
– management of relational databases; 
– cross-copying, import and export of project data; 
– create and edit fault trees using AND, OR, M-out-of-N
and negation logic operators; 
– create and edit event trees; 
– perform fault trees and event trees qualitative and quan-
titative analysis with automated CCF modelling using bi-
nomial failure rate, beta-factor, alpha-factor and multiple
Greek letters models; 
– perform importance analysis, sensitivity analysis and un-
certainty analysis. Uncertainty analysis is performing by
Monte Carlo method based on selection of random base
events reliability data values); 
– failure mode and effects analysis; 
– edit minimal cutsets; 
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Fig. 1. Generalized flowchart of the CRISS 5.3 software system. 
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 – optimize of the system composition based on economic
criteria; 
– printout and save fault trees and event trees graphic im-
ages, qualitative and quantitative analysis results, impor-
tance analysis, sensitivity analysis and uncertainty analysis
results in standard Microsoft Word format; 
– import/export of the database and logical models (fault
trees and event trees) from/into the Risk Spectrum PSA
Professional software system used in the industry for
PSAs; 
– develop new report templates and to edit existing tem-
plates; 
– differentiate of the user access rights for the program op-
eration. 
CRISS 5.3 allows to perform all tasks of full-scale proba-
ilistic safety analysis using fault trees and event trees meth-
ds. The software does not limit the PSA model dimension-
lity. 
erification of the criss 5.3 psa software system 
The CRISS 5.3 software system was verified at OKBM
frikantov in 2015. The verification was based on compar-
ng the results of an analysis using the CRISS 5.3 system
gainst analytical formulas (analytical tests) and results of a
ualitative and quantitative analysis using certified software
ools for the nuclear plant PSA: CRISS 5.1 and RiskSpec-
rum PSA Professional (computational tests). The CRISS 5.3erification matrix also included a set of sophisticated prob-
bilistic logical models for the assessment of the verifying
rogram’s speed. 
No experimental findings are used to verify the software
ntended to analyze the reliability of systems and to imple-
ent probabilistic safety analysis. Successful verification of
uch programs suggests the absolute coincidence of calcula-
ion results for analytical tests. For computational tests, the
iscrepancy in the results of an analysis based on different
rograms with a similar input may be explained by a dif-
erence in the algorithms used. This approach to the PSA
oftware verification was used to certify earlier versions of
RISS [5] and other Russian software tools for similar ap-
lications [6] . 
The following may be concluded from a comparison of
alculation results based on test examples. 
– A qualitative analysis of probabilistic logical models for
analytical tests conducted manually and using CRISS 5.3
leads to identical results in the form of similar sets of
minimal cutsets both on the assumption of independent
failures and with regard for common-cause failures. 
– The results of a quantitative analysis based on analytical
tests and conducted manually and using CRISS 5.3 do not
have a discrepancy. 
– A qualitative analysis of probabilistic logical models for
computational tests performed using the RiskSpectrum 
PSA Professional program, the certified CRISS 5.1 pro-
gram and using the CRISS 5.3 system leads to identical
results in the form of similar sets of minimal cutsets both
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Table 2 
CRISS 5.3 verification results. 
Test example Analysis results 
CRISS 5.3 CRISS 5.1 RiskSpectrum Professional 
C.1 test example 3.04 Е–04 3.038 Е-04 2.99E–04 
- independent failures 1.98E–03 – 1.94E–03 
- CCF accounting based on α-factor model 5.71E–04 – 5.62E–04 
- CCF accounting based on MGL model 7.18E–04 – 7.07E–04 
- CCF accounting based on binomial 
failure rate model 
1.89E–03 1.89E–03 –
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 on the assumption of independent failures and with regard
for common-cause failures. 
– A quantitative analysis of computational test examples
based on the CRISS 5.3 and CRISS 5.1 programs leads
to identical results. 
– A quantitative analysis based on a range of computational
test examples and conducted using the CRISS 5.3 program
yields identical or more conservative results (by up to 4%),
as compared to Risk Spectrum Professional, due to failures
being more accurately accounted for in the CRISS software
algorithm for periodically tested elements in redundant sys-
tems. Table 2 presents the results of a verification based
on the C.1 computational test example in the form of a
complex fault tree modelling one of the safety systems of
a nuclear plant with the BN reactor. 
– The acceleration factor for the runtime of an analysis based
on the CRISS 5.3 program, as compared against CRISS
5.1, is 2 to 3.3. A comparison of the runtime for an analy-
sis based on CRISS 5.3 and RiskSpectrum 1.1.3 ′ s current
version shows that the programs are at the same level of
speed of calculations. 
Conclusion 
CRISS 5.3, a PSA software system, was developed and
verified in 2013–2015 as part of Afrikantov OKBM’s New
Generation Codes effort. CRISS 5.3 allows effectively perform all tasks of full-scale
robabilistic safety analysis of nuclear plants developed under
he Proryv project, while not limiting the dimensionality of
SA models and offering a high speed of calculations. 
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